Denis Ferguson

I've been thinking long and hard about Denis Ferguson and my attitude to him. Ferguson is a convicted pedophile and has finished serving a 14 year term for kidnapping and abusing three children. His story has hit the headlines recently because at a number of different houses where he's been put the community has reared up to kick him out.

When I first heard the story last year (earlier this year?) he was in Queensland, and my sympathies were with Ferguson. He'd served his time, he ought to be treated like anybody else, and he has to live somewhere.

But more recently, he was discovered to be living in Ryde. This is a couple of suburbs away from my place. And my attitude was completely different. I don't want him living any where near me or my children. And now, I can understand more clearly why there are such violent oppositions to his presence. I want him a long way away, I don't care where, just no where near my kids.

And to my great shame, I also wished that he'd been murdered in prison. The reports spoke of pedophiles being the lowest scum in prison, and how they had to be kept in isolation, otherwise they'd be killed. And I wished they'd just let 'justice' take its course. But how could I? Its worse than demanding the death penalty for these people.

And then I wonder about grace, and forgiveness. And how I used to say lines like, if Adolf Hitler repented and believed, he'd be saved. But I don't want Denis Ferguson to be saved, forgiven, redeemed. And I thank God that he is full of justice and grace, and that I don't have to make such decisions.

Hitler's relatives

Intriguing article about some dudes tracking down all living relatives of Hitler here. I wonder if they know? And would you tell them? How'd that go down at the local P&C meeting?

Interestingly, there are three living in USA who know, and have been living under a false name. The article concludes with this statement:

''The American relatives have agreed not to have children to extinguish the saga of Hitler and stop living in fear, but have promised to publish a book before they die,'' said Mulders.

Inherited sin lives on. Or is it a sinful disposition? Or guilt?

Kevin Giles, Jesus and the Father, Conclusion

Conclusion

In the conclusion Giles writes that he does not call his opponents 21st Century Arians (p. 308), although one could be mistaken for thinking this—'how they were reading the bible and depicting the Father-Son relationship almost one for one matched how the so-called "Arians" of the fourth century [did]" (p. 306).

These are the main points that Giles presents for his understanding of the Trinity.

1. The God of Christian Revelation is one divine being and three "persons" (p. 309).

2. The three divine persons are inseparable in operations (p. 309).

3. The three divine persons are indivisible in power and authority. [...] Each is omnipotent without any caveats (p. 310).

4. The three divine persons have one will. [...] It is the human will of Jesus that is obedient to the one divine will. [...] To speak of the Father eternally commanding and the Son obeying, freely or otherwise, is to depict the Father-Son relationship in terms of fallen human relationships. (p. 310). (presumably Giles has forgotten Gen 2 where God commands Adam who is expected to obey before the fall!) (I've mentioned the wills question before. It seems that its more acceptable to argue that Jesus had two wills in the one person, one obeying the other, than that there are three wills in the one God, united. This is because will is seen as an attribute of God and so shared equally by all three persons, but I wonder if this is the best way of thinking about it. In 1 Cor 12 the Spirit is said to give gifts according to his will. In the Garden, Jesus submits to the will of the Father not the godhead.) (p. 311)

5. The three divine persons are eternally differentiated by not divided. [...] grounded on three things: individual identity, differing origination, and differing relations (the Father is the Father of the Son etc). (p. 311)

6. There is order among the divine three persons. (p. 312)

7. The son is subordinated in the incarnation. [...] the Son of God voluntarily relinquished his status but not his divinity or being as God assuming the form of a servant. [...] This means that waht is creaturely in Christ must not be read back into the eternal or immanent Trinity. The son continues as God and man after his resurrection, but his humanity is glorified and exalted. None of the limitations necessitated in taking human flesh are present. (p. 312)

He leaves his readers (opponents) three options. One ignore his compelling case, two, stop linking the woman question with the Trinity question and so agree with Giles on Trinity if not the question of women, or three, agree with him.

One the whole, the book has been worth reading, if frustrating. It seems that he is very angry and passionate about his case, and so his argument gets lost in the rhetoric. Some questions and problems I have with the book follow.

1. I don't think he has wrestled enough with the revealed order within the Godhead and its implications.

2. This may sound arrogant, and I don't mean it to be, but at key points I think he hasn't understood the position of his opponents, and so his counter arguments actually miss the target. A lot of what he presents as his case against them are things that fit squarely within their model.

3. I think at points he confuses the categories of person and being, and at other points the inner and 'outer' trinity.

4. I think his understanding of the incarnation, and particularly his view of the resurrected and exalted Christ is seriously flawed. While saying that Christ remains man, his arguments give the impression of docetism.

5. I question his methodology at points. Obviously we disagree on the question of the immanent and economic Trinity. But also I think he relies too much on categorising what belongs to the human nature of Christ and what belongs to his divine nature. Given that Christ is only presented to us as God become man, I don't think that that is easy to do. In the case of this book, Giles puts obedience down to Christ's human nature, whereas I think that it is part of his divine personhood. But, how does one make the call either way. And finally, I think that he has a tendency to squash exegesis with his theological framework, or 'canonical rules'. But in my opinion, good, holistic, careful exegesis always trumps theological presuppositions, or positions. I don't think that Giles allows the texts to push his position as much as he should and they do.

The book has challenged me and created a desire to pursue some different aspects of the trinity, most particularly, to think through the wills question, to think through the methodology some more, and to think more about what is distinct between the being and person of the Godhead.

Kevin Giles, Jesus and the Father, Chapter 8

Chapter 8 - Subordination and Obedience in the Theology of Karl Barth

Giles dedicates a chapter to what Barth has to say on this, partly because he deserves it, and partly because he was heavily criticised for his reliance on him in his earlier book because on first glance it seems that Barth teaches the opposite to what Giles argued. Giles argues that Barth doesn't teach the subordination of the Son, but that any subordination tendencies are seen only as Christ in identification with man, and that there is a strong dialectic in his thinking of Jesus as both Lord and Servant. To say that Barth teaches subordination of the Son denies this dialectic. Indeed, Giles argues that the challenge of Barth's thinking is that what God reveals as the Son in his servanthood is not just true for the Son but for the whole Godhead, that God is both high and humble.

Giles shows that Barth rejects the old distinction in thinking about Jesus which divided some parts to his humanity and some to his divinity. Giles disagrees with this ultimately, but works with it effectively throughout the chapter. However, it was hard to tell at times how this was different from Barth's new distinction, Christ as the electing God and 'Christ identified with man'. I'm not sure if this is true of Barth, or just Giles seeing his own paradigm here anyway. Eg, he says, 'It is Jesus Christ identified with man who freely chooses to be obedient to the Father, to suffer and to die' (p. 292). Giles big point here is that Jesus is the electing God who freely chose to be obedient. He says this to counter the idea of the Son having to obey, by necessity. Now, to be fair, if this has been said, in this way, I think it is unfortunate and poor wording. To speak of the Son's submission in such a way as to deny his free volition, is I think, dangerous. I suspect Giles, in part responds to this. However, to say that the Son freely obeys does not deny that it is appropriate to his person as Son to do so, and that it would be inappropriate for him to command the Father, and vice versa. In that sense, I think that the Son's obedience is necessary, but his necessary obedience is always freely given in loving service (if I may put it that way).

He then moves to discuss the prickly passage for him in Barth. Giles quotes Barth as 'there is in God Himself an above and below, a prius and posterius, a superiority and subordination, ... that it belongs to the inner life of God' or again, 'the one God "is both the One obeyed and Another who obeys"' (p. 297). And again, 'In his mode of being as the Son he fulfils the Divine subordination, just as the Father in his mode of being as the Father fulfils the Divine Superiority' (p. 298). In response, Giles argues that in Barth's thinking, Christ always reveals the whole of God, and so in this we see not the Son subordinated but the whole God—'God is not other than he is in Jesus Christ. If Christ is high and humble, so too is the Father and the Spirit' (p. 298). This is an interesting solution, and worth thinking seriously about, given we are so strong in saying that Jesus perfectly reveals the Father. However, on first glance, I think that it makes the mistake of confusing what Jesus shows us of God with what Jesus shows us of the divine relations. And if we don't keep those distinctions we fall headlong into modalism.

Like lots of the people Giles refers to, it feels that he can't disagree with Barth. This chapter reads as though he knows Barth's thinking is a bit dodgy on this, but he's trying really hard to make him kocher. Sometimes the other theologians have this feel as well. I feel that the book would have been much stronger had he just said - Barth teaches this, and on this, Barth is wrong, rather than trying to work Barth into a position similar to his own. Indeed, I feel the whole book would have been stronger if Giles had presented and argued for a position, rather than trying to fit a whole bunch of differently minded theologians into his own mindset.

Kevin Giles, Jesus and the Father, Chapter 7

Chapter 7 - The Economic and Immanent Trinity: Correspondence Yes, Identity No

If the last chapter discussed the main issue of the debate, this chapter hits probably the key methodological issue. Can we say that the way the Son relates to the Father during the incarnation is the way he always relates or not?

Giles gives the background of Rahner's maxim, 'the economic trinity is the immanent trinity and the immanent trinity is the economic trinity'. He shows that there are a number of ways this can be understood, and then gives us his own thoughts.

I want to argue that the immanent Trinity must be given, might we say, a life of its own. God is triune even if had not created the world of the Son had become incarnate. [...] It is true that all we know of the immanent Trinity is given in revelation but revelation does not and cannot fully reveal God to human minds. As a 'restricter' I take Rahner's rule to speak of a correlation between the economic and immanent Trinity, not identification. The limitations that the Son gladly assumed for our salvation in becoming man must not be read back into the immanent Trinity.

[...]Basic to the position I am taking is the premise that the revelation of economic Trinity is far more than the incarnation. I want to make the point that the triune God reveals himself in history from the creation to the consummation: forth ebook of Genesis to the book of Revelation. If the economic Trinity is limited to what is revealed in the incarnation, then the eternal subordination of the Son naturally follows. Jesus is subordinated on earth, and thus must be subordinated in heaven. To counter this line of reasoning, I argue that the incarnation is not the totality of what is revealed of God, Father, Son and Spirit in the Bible. (p. 256)

Karl Rahner

Giles explores some other things in this chapter about Rahner's maxim but this is the essence of it. I think the idea is that we can't take what is human and finite in Jesus and put it onto the Trinity for all eternity. And Giles sees that the obedience of Jesus is part of his human limitations, and so is not part of the person of the Son for all eternity. The assumption he makes, I think, is that obedience is only ever a human action and not divine. This could be questioned, and its on this very issue that it should be. That is, there are some that argue that the obedience that the Son shows while on earth is true for his person for all eternity, rather than something he takes on only as a human. That, I guess, is the million dollar question.

Two things to note. First, I think Giles makes the error of confusing revelation with ontology. He seems to argue that if we identify the immanent and economic trinities that we then make God dependent on the incarnation for his Tri-unity. But that doesn't make sense to me. God is always triune, and this tri-unity is seen accurately in his engagement with creation. But that doesn't mean his tri-unity exists in that engagement.

Secondly, although it is reasonable to say that there is more to God than our human minds can conceive, we need to be really careful when making conclusions about him based on that. It leads ultimately to mysticism. This idea protects the complexity and enormity of God rather than throwing questions on his faithfulness. While we will no longer see him dimly, as though in a reflection, there will be no surprises. What he has revealed of himself in Scripture is what we will see. In any case, if you argue that there is more to God than what he has revealed, how can you know what that more is, and that it is different from what is revealed. That is, if the son's submission is revealed in the economy, if you know nothing more of the immanent Trinity, how can you say that the submission is not there.

Giles sees the economy as God's work throughout all of history and in all of Scripture, rather than just the incarnation. This means that what we know of the economic Trinity we know from all of Scripture. Therefore, we can know nothing else of the Trinity apart from the economy, and therefore we need to be extremely tentative in saying that the immanent Trinity is not the economic Trinity, for then we postulate a God who is different somehow that the God given to us in Scripture, the God who has given himself to us.

kevin Giles, Jesus and the Father, Chapter 6

Chapter 6 Differentiating the Trinitarian Persons

This chapter on the differentiation of the divine persons I found disappointing (perhaps having got my hopes up). Too much time was spent on evidence which was irrelevant to the debate. The real issue is what does the order of persons look like. Giles shows that it is orthodoxy to teach that the persons are ordered, even though he wants to deny strongly that there is an hierarchical order. This is the key question - what does the order look like? But too little time was spent on it, and when mentioned, were just passing references to acknowledge that there is an order. Too much of the chapter was spent on the fact that so and so agreed that there are persons.

When it comes down to it, even after acknowledging this order, it seems that Giles is only happy to say that the persons are differentiated on personal identity alone.

The Bible would suggest that personal identity is what primarily and indelibly distinguishes the divine three. The Father is the Father and not the Son or the SPirit, the Son is the Son and not the Father or the Spirit, and the Spirit is no the Father and the Son, yet they are never divided or separated. They are, as Basil argued, united in the most perfect and intimate communion. Differing origination or differing relations of origin are simply attempts to explain these personal and eternal distinctions within the one God. (p. 239)

The thing is, that this doesn't really leave us with very much. All he is saying is that there are three persons, which are distinct. But nothing more. We have names for them, but those names don't have any real meaning, because of the language issues. They could be Frank, Bob and Sally. And to my mind, this is entirely unsatisfactory. It is not too much to suggest that the Father and the Son have revealed themselves as such because that is who they are, and that there is significance to that. Likewise, the Spirit can be associated with the wind (or spirit) in John 3 because his name has real meaning. And even if we don't spend time thinking about the significance of the names of the persons given to us by Jesus, can we not explore what it means that the bible, and historical orthodoxy sees the order in the Trinitarian persons as being from the Father, through the Son and by the Spirit?

For example, Athanasius says, 'The Father does all things through the Word in the Holy Spirit' and that the Father 'works through the Son' and 'speaks through the Son' (p. 219). Or Basil, 'And in creation think first, I pray thee, of the original cause of all things that are made, the Father, of the creative cause, the Son, and of the perfecting cause, the Spirit' (p. 225). But on this all Giles says is, 'all of them speak of an order (taxis) in divine operations which in no way impacts on their equality, yet it distinguishes them' (p. 225).

Likewise, Calvin affirms their order:

We teach from the Scriptures that God is one in essence, and hence that the essence both of the Son and the of the Spirit is unbegotten; but inasmuch as the Father is first in order, and from himself begot his Wisdom (the Son), as has just been said, he is rightly deemed the beginning and fountainhead of the whole of divinity (p. 234-5).

Again, rather than exploring what this might mean, Giles just denies that it affects his case,

In the above quote Calvin gives a carefully circumscribed priority to the Father, designating him as 'the fountainhead of all deity', but in doing so does not suggest any subordination of being, work, or authority in the Son (or the Spirit) (p. 235).

I would have like to see him explore this, rather than acknowledge it, say it doesn't mean he's wrong and then move on to less relevant issues. This order is there, and consistently is said to be from the Father, through the Son and by/in the Spirit. So what does that mean for they way they relate as persons?

It seems to me that the whole book should have been written on this very issue. It is unsatisfactory to say that there is an order, but that order is not hierarchical, so his opponents are wrong. Explore this issue, articulate clearly the points of difference and say why they are wrong.

So both sides agree with an order (even if Giles refuses to make anything of it). Both agree that the Father works through the Son by the Spirit. Both sides agree that the Son receives things from the Father, and is sent by the Father. One side says that is appropriate to his sonship, and reflects the headship of the Father to which the Son voluntarily, joyfully and eternally submits. The other side says that this order doesn't imply that at all, and that the order maintains a pure equality between the persons. Surely this could be explored and detailed and the points of difference established. It can be, and stop calling me Shirley.

A lot is made of wording: order, sub-order, hierarchical order, horizontal order. Instead of just name calling, or saying that a particular view is hierarchical, it would have been useful to explore their differences.

One final note. Giles accuses his opponents of not using language as it is used in every day speech, and so has a big problem with the way that they use the word difference, which in his mind doesn't indicate any hierarchy, but he sees that the way they use it in Equal but Different does. This may be a fair critique, we need to be careful the way we use and define words. But a similar question could be asked of Giles who has emptied the terms Father and Son of anything that would look like an everyday usage. At some stage we have to wrestle seriously with the fact that these are not arbitrary words or names that carry no significance, but actually mean something.

Kevin Giles, Jesus and the Father, Chapter 5

Chapter 5: The Father and the Son Divided or Undivided in Power and Authority

The next theme that Giles considers in historical orthodoxy is that of whether the Father has authority over the Son. After surveying the usual suspects he concludes that to say so is to go against the orthodox tradition which has held that the Father, Son and Spirit are all equally omnipotent, and that the Son is only subservient in the incarnation.

Before we go on to summarise his work, let me say two things that are essentially definitional disagreements that I have with Giles, such that this chapter was very frustrating. First, Giles keeps asserting that the Son is seen to be omnipotent, and equal in power with the Father as evidence for his case. Yet, as we've spoken of before, the question has never been whether the Son is omnipotent or not—of course he is, for he shares in full divinity. He is one with the Father in power. Its not a question of his power or authority in himself, but his authority in relation to the Father, and that is not answered by continual assertion that he is full of majesty and power and rules as Lord. That is, the arguments for the full divinity of Christ are, in a sense, irrelevant to the debate.

Second, Giles equates power and authority, so that in quoting someone who attributes all power to the Son reads it as also attributing all authority to the Son. Now, obviously they are closely related, but it is not treating his opponents with any respect to ignore the subtle differences in this. It is crude (and incorrect!) to say that the Father has more power than the Son, but it may be entirely Biblical (as I think!) to say that the Son submits to the Father's authority.

The How and Why of Eternal Subordination

After illustrating the position of his opponents, (eg. Letham: 'Being God he serves the Father', or Thomas Smail, 'Obedience to the Father is what is "proper to his Sonship"' (p. 174)) he talks about why and how they argue for their position. The why we have seen before:

They want us to believe that the Son of God obeys the Father like women should obey the men set over them by God. [...] Every conservative evangelical article or book arguing for the eternal obedience of the Son has this agenda dictating how the doctrine of the Trinity is to be understood. (p. 175)

The how is twofold, analogical and textual. Firstly, they appeal to a human father-son relationship. Giles problem with this is that it 'sets human experience over biblical revelation' (p. 176), and that 'Human language is never adequate to speak about God' (p. 176). Giles speaks of the language being metaphorical, and that the content has to be given purely by Scripture, not by any appeal to human relationships. Now, while I agree somewhat, and that the analogy should be from God to humanity not the other way around, such that I would say that God the Father not only is a real Father, but is the real Father, I wonder if this argument is really taken seriously. Because, surely, if you are serious about it it would throw into the air all your terms, not just those you dislike, such as person, or being, or equal. Indeed, when Jesus says that he is equal to the Father (or something to that effect in Jn 8), can we understand equality the way we would in human relationships (as Giles does) or should we purely fill its content from Scripture, allowing perhaps an unequal equality (or an equal but different position!). There is real truth to the dangers of thinking in a 1-1 total coherence in usage of words applied to humans and God, but also a real danger in indiscriminately applying an 'analogical' rule, and taken to its logical extreme leads to apophatism (just saying what we cannot know about God), which leads us no where. I think that we can be confident in the language that God has used of himself. Sermon over.

Second, they appeal to 1 Cor 11:3. Giles says that in this context kephale 'does not mean "head over" or "authority over"' (p. 176).

So, Giles looks to see if in the tradition the Father and the Son are differentiated by power and authority.

Monarchianism.

To safe guard the unity of God this word was prominent in the early church to indicate the sole rule of God. Not three rules but one. Tertullian 'argued that the one God shared his rule with his Son and the Spirit without ever compromising his unity' (p. 177).

Athanasius

Giles refers to the Athanasius rule, that the same things are said of the Son which are said of the Father, to conclude that 'the Father and the son are inseparably one in being work/function and authority' (p. 178). At this point he introduces Doylie and Baddley to show that they are wrong in their reading of Athanasius.

The monarchy or sole rule of the Father, Doyle argues, is basic to Athanasius' understanding of divine Fatherhood. I am not convinced. In every case where Athanasius speaks of God the Father ruling, the Son is ruling with him. (p. 180)

For Athanasius the incarnation did not involve any diminution of the Son's divinity or authority. And the Father and the Son share the divine attributes equally. The Tension of the prayer in the garden is between the human and divine wills in the one Christ.

The Cappadocians

They say that 'the Son's obedience was not compulsory submission to the will of the Father, but rather a coincidence of willing' (p. 186). (Excursus: In this section on will, Giles quotes the Cappadocians saying things such as 'the transmission of will [...] passing without note of time from Father to Son', or 'If the Father wills anything, the Son who is in the Father knows the Father's will, and he is the Father's will' (p. 187). He does this to affirm the unity of will and so the equality in power of the Son to the Father. Yet, he doesn't discuss what it means that this unity of will is expressed in that language of being from the Father, and the Son being the Father's will. It was similar with Athanasius, 'The Logos is the Father's will', and also with the attributes, 'He is himself the Father's power and wisdom' (p. 183). Their sharing in the divine substance is ordered, and both Athanasius and the Cappadocians seem to see that this ordering is from the Father to the Son, or through the Son. What does this indicate for their equality in power. These sort of subtleties (of which in my meagre reading of the Patristics there are plenty!) and the entirely different way of thinking about the divine persons are just not discussed, and so not incorporated into his model of the Trinity leaving it feeling rather simplistic.)

Giles discusses the Cappadocian reading of 1 Cor 11:3. Here he quotes Basil as saying,

If "the head of man is Christ, and the head of Christ is God," and man is not of one substance with Christ, who is God (for man is not God), but Christ is of one substance with God (for he is God), therefore God is not the head of Christ, in the same sense as Christ is the head of man. [...] God is head of Christ as Father, Christ is head of us as maker. (p. 189)

Given Basil reads kephale differently from Giles here, (as head rather than source), Giles is still happy to affirm this quote, because Basil

in neither pairing sees the kephale/head imagery [as] suggesting 'authority over'. In the first pair he mentions he says the word kephale implies a Father -Son relationship, in the second, Christ and man, a Creator-creature relationship (p. 190)

Now, ignoring for a moment the Father-Son relationship, surely Giles would agree that there is an 'authority over' implied in the Creator-creature relationship. It takes a particular amount of imagination to suggest otherwise, and if there is some 'authority over' in that relationship, then Basil may well have seen some in the Father-Son relationship, even if it is not in the same sense.

Augustine

Augustine argues that being sent doesn't imply an inferiority in power, just that you are from the sender. He speaks of Christ going willingly and voluntarily to the Cross, and so of his temporal obedience. Augustine writes beautifully, 'what greater example of obedience could be given to us ... than God the Son obeying God the Father even to death on the cross' ( p. 193). And finally, that 'in becoming man, the son voluntarily made himself '"less than" the Father by taking the form of a servant. This did not involve the giving up of his divinity or divine attributes' (p. 194).

So for Augustine, the Son in human form is 'less than' the Father, such that he is obedient, yet one in power and authority, not losing any of his divinity. If here in human form, why can he not also be obedient and yet one in power and authority in divine relations for eternity? A question to which we shall return.

Athanasian Creed

According to Giles it was written c. 500 AD and encapsulates as the Catholic Faith essentially Augustine's teaching on the Trinity. For those who are not entirely convinced by Augustine's trinitarian theology, this may be of some concern. Giles refers to three clauses which explicitly deny that the Son is less than the Father in authority. Two of which affirm basically that the Son is Lord just as the Father is Lord, which, as we said at the beginning, is irrelevant. The third says, 'In this Trinity none is greater or less than another ... all are coequal' (p. 194). This is important, but we need some context to know specifically what it speaks of. That none is greater in divinity does not necessarily rule out that the Father is the head of the Son. It may.

Calvin

Giles spends sometime on Calvin's arguments for the full divinity of God—'his works all depict him as omnipotent God' (p. 195), and affirms that for Calvin, (even while he is in his subordinated state of incarnation) 'the Father, Son, and Spirit are inseparable in work or function and indivisible in authority and power' (p. 196). Again we see this unity of authority and power being argued for the Son and the Father whilst the Son is in the form of a servant, and again we ask, if then, why not for eternity? And what do you understand by this 'subordinated' state if their is no distinction in power and authority. I'm not sure Giles' picked this up, because a page later he speaks of Calvin's thoughts being that any frailty and obedience referring solely to his incarnat existence, but as the divine son he is equal to the father in authority and power etc. However, he's already spent some time showing that as the incarnate Son he is equal to the Father in power and 'never relinquishes any of his prerogative as omnipotent God' (p. 196). There is, at the very least, some confusion here. Probably my own.

Giles favourably quotes Gerald Bray on Calvin,

By saying that each person of the Trinity is autotheos [God in himself], Calvin has ensured that the relations between them must be voluntary, since no one person can claim the authority to impose his will on the others. But this freedom can never imply contradiction or lead to anarchy, because in God there is but a single will, which is governed by the operation of his perfect love. (p. 197)

Giles then quotes Calvin's exegesis of 1 Cor 15:24-28 to show that Calvin sees that at that time we will enjoy a direct vision of the Godhead, where Christ having given up his mediatorial role according to Giles is no longer in his humbled state. Some selections of the quote which I found edifying, and which point, in my mind, to the Son's own glory, or his glory as Son, are

For what purpose were power and Lordship given to Christ, unless that by his hand the Father might govern us. [...] But when as partakers in heavenly glory we shall see God as he is, Christ having then been discharged the office of Mediator, will cease to be the ambassador of his Father and will be satisfied with the glory which he enjoyed before the creation of the word. ... Then he returns the lordship to his Father so that—far from diminishing his own majesty—it may shine all the more brightly. (p. 198)

To me, that sounds very much like the Father giving authority to the Son who then returns it to the Father, and then having given over the kingdom his own glory is perfected in his Father's ruling. The glory he had with the Father as the only Son. This 'sharing' of divine rule has a definite order to it. In contrast, following that quote, Giles says that 'the evidence in unambiguous', the 'Son's subordination and obedience is limited to the incarnation' (p. 199).

Twentieth Century

Giles moves on to point out that on this issue two key theologians of the last century have broken with the tradition, Barth and Pannenberg. He approves of Pannenbergs novel approach to the Trinity but is wary of some of its conclusions. Barth, on the other hand, he reserves a chapter for later in the book. This is because criticisms of the earlier argued that Giles' case hung heavily on Barth but that he had misread him. He says,

What I found by reading Barth is that while he does break with the tradition by speaking of Christ as subordinate, obedient and suffering as God, he never lets go of the belief that Christ is also at the same time Lord. For him the Son is never the subordinated, suffering, obedient Son simpliciter. He is always both Lord and servant. [...] Evangelicals who appeal to Barth in support for their doctrine of the eternal subordination for the Son in authority miss this dialectic in Barth's christological Trinitarianism (p. 201)

Now, it seems to me that if he can acknowledge that Barth can hold to God the Son being both Lord and obedient why cannot he allow such grace to his opponents, and then we could pack our bat and ball and go home. It may not be a dialectic in their thought (as I imagine that they don't see the two mutually exclusive, or opposed), but it is a similar idea nonetheless.

Insurmountable Theology

Giles concludes the chapter by raising two issues that he sees as insurmountable for those who want to hold that the Son is under the Father's authority. The first is that this indicates that the Father has more power than the Son, which is clearly wrong. But this is just silly. I spoke about this at the beginning. They share in omnipotence as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, but that does not necessarily rule out that that Father is head over the Son. Second, Giles says that the language of commanding and obeying implies that each person has a will, which is contrary to the tradition that there is one will in God. I've spoken before about how I need to do more thinking on this, but I question it, on the basis of my understanding that will is essential to personhood, and what does it mean to be a person without a will. I think that the divine wills are aligned and one in the sense of being united, but not that there is one shared will. But I suspect I am wrong on this. In any case, if you are going to make a point like this, what is the value in emphasising that the Son voluntarily humbled himself, for surely that implies a will just as much.

Finally, he summarises his points.

In both perspectives it is recognized that the incarnation necessitated the divine Son of God taking the form of a servant, but orthodoxy insists that he never ceased to be God and thus never gave up the power and authority that are intrinsically his as true God. (p. 203).

But, again I have to ask, if they can be held together in the incarnation such that neither are diminished, why cannot there be obedience of the Son and yet divine authority for all eternity?